A handbook of this size, with contributions from over 50 scholars, covers a wide range of subjects and this volume makes a significant contribution to furthering interest in the evolution of language. Topics from diverse disciplines related to the evolution of language are presented, a number of them open to controversy or undecided opinion. The editors come from complementary backgrounds of linguistics (Tallerman) and neurobiology and anatomy (Gibson). The book is divided into five sections, each preceded by a useful introduction by both of the editors: animal studies, human biology, the prehistory of language, the development of a linguistic species and language change in historical times. There is much to commend in this handbook, with wide coverage of many fields, but there are also some notable omissions, particularly on the extensive research in neuroscience in the last decade. The contributions from empirical studies that can throw light on controversial issues is uneven, and some omissions could lead to mistaken impressions about overall work in the field.
However, there is much valuable material in this handbook. The first section Insights from comparative animal behaviour gives an excellent overview, and some fascinating detail, of a much studied field, with contributions from biologists and psychologists. These chapters, 2 to 11, focus on characteristics of animal communication that could be possible stepping stones to the acquisition of human language, as well as on necessary features that seem to be lacking in animals. The chapters on ape "language" are primarily concerned with finding out what characteristics of human speech can be observed in apes. Though they cannot vocalize, they can learn a few symbolic representations from a human but seem not to communicate in this way in the wild. They can string words together, but without syntactic structure. Signed gestures have also been produced by gorillas and orangutangs, but comprehension seems more advanced than production. On another essential component of any dialogue Gibson (chapter 3) concludes that chimpanzees do have an ability to infer others' intentions, a rudimentary "theory of mind" (discussed further below). Following on from this Seyfarth and Cheney (chapter 4) hypothesize that the prelinguistic human ancestor had limited vocal production but open-ended comprehension. Basing his writing on primary field work Zuberbuhler (chapter 5) reports on a possible link between allocare (care by the group as well as by the mother) with its concomitant interactions, and vocal behaviour. The main function of infant babbling of pygmy marmosets appears to be to enhance social bonding through contingent interaction.
Further chapters in this section explore possible parallels between bird song and human language. In common they are both learnable, both can be compositional as different elements are combined in variable ways, and both can involve turn taking. They differ in communicative intent -the avian repertoire is typically repeated over and over. Another aspect is Pepperberg's research with the remarkable grey parrot Alex (chapter 10), with its reported ability to learn symbolic representation, to perceive, imitate and produce new sequences of vocal sounds in a quasi-dialogue with a human. It will be interesting to see if this can be reproduced in another parrot. Janik (chapter 9) gives a tantalizing taste of work with cetaceans. Different species of dolphins and whales have their own typical acoustic signalling behaviour, both for communication and for exploring the environment through echolocation. They also can learn song sequences and produce new ones composed of multiple elements. Signature whistles account for about half their signals, but little is known about the purpose of the other half. Bottlenose dolphins can understand symbolic representation: they can learn to associate a few gestures by a human with prescribed actions and objects, as described by Gibson (Chapter 11). Some dolphins cooperate to herd their prey into dense groups, then feed in turn in an orderly way; of course turn taking is a requisite for human speech. A topic that deserves further investigation is communication between animals in pack hunting. In contrast to dolphins some recent work suggests that wolves' behaviour in pack hunting can be modelled without requiring communication between them.
The second section of this handbook addresses The biology of language evolution: anatomy, genetics and neurology. The editors' introduction to this section starts by recalling old arguments about instinct versus learning. The hypothesis that there is a language instinct is often associated with the theory that there is an identifiable location for a language acquisition device, but the authors here conclude, in line with recent research, that multiple parts of the brain are involved in language evolution, and that "Nothing that we know about genetic or neural functions would suggest that language arose in response to a sudden mutation or the sudden appearance of a new neural module" (page 142). Incremental change is consistent with what is known of other evolutionary processes. Next in this section, Fitch (chapter 13) reviews the nature / nurture debate, and explains the terminological inexactitudes that contribute to disagreements. We learn to use the terms innate or instinct with utmost caution.
Eventually we reach Diller and Cann's excellent chapter Genetic influences on language evolution: an evaluation of the evidence (chapter 15). They give an overview of the story around the FOXP2 gene and its association with hereditary agrammatic speech deficits in a certain family. This was popularly considered a "grammar gene" for a while, genetic evidence for Chomsky's proposed innate Universal Grammar. As the authors explain, this gene, in its mutated form in the hominem line, is necessary but not sufficient for speech production, and has roles in other cognitive processes too. They argue convincingly that the disputed date of the mutation, which might throw some light on the timetable of the evolution of language, was probably more than 200,000 years ago (200 kya), before the emergence of anatomically modern humans. Other genes associated with language are microcephalin and ASPM, defective versions of which produce people with small heads and small brains. However, microcephalics can learn to speak to about the level of a 6-yearold child, and this has important repercussions on theories about the role of brain size in the evolution of language. The modern human brain is significantly larger than those of non-human primates, but neural organisation as well as size must be involved in language acquisition.
MacLarnon (chapter 22) gives a valuable survey of anatomical features relevant to speech production, based on empirical research. She puts some contentious issues into perspective: for instance, the importance of a descended vocal tract in humans -at one time over-emphasized, then dismissed when other mammals were seen to have a similar configuration. However, recent research on the integrated evolution of modern human cranial features contributes to a better understanding of the evolution of the vocal tract and its permanent descent, together with associated descent of the hyoid bone. These are part of a suite of distinctive factors that enable speech production. "What distinguishes human speech ... is the extraordinary range of acoustic variation .... an enormous variety of gestural articulations of the vocal tract, together with intricate manipulations of the larynx and other respiratory structures". A useful table gives a summary of proposed evolution of human speech production features with approximate dates.
However, when we come to the Neurology part of this section, coverage is limited. A chapter on Mirror systems: evolving imitation and the bridge from praxis to language" by Arbib (chapter 20) looks like a good starting point, but is not followed by any other contributions from this well researched field. Arbib draws on work in recent decades which shows how a single neuron in the macaque monkey can fire when the monkey executes some manual action, such as grasping, and also fires when the monkey observes another executing the action. The Mirror System Hypothesis generalised this observation and "emphasizes the parity requirement for communication via language -that what counts for the speaker must count approximately the same for the hearer" (page 207). However, as has often been pointed out, it is not necessary to be able to execute an action in order to perceive it: human infants can understand words before they can produce them themselves, and you can enjoy music without being able to play. The parity requirement can apply in a more restricted domain to actions that are within repertoire. Arbib implicitly seems to accept this without explicitly saying so.
Unfortunately there is nothing more on this topic, and little on other neuroscientific research, in spite of extensive work in the field. Other neuroscientific research relates to hotly debated issues on theories following variants of Chomsky's Universal Grammar concept. Tallerman says that "many linguists postulate that syntax is a separate, biologicallydetermined entity" (page 442). However, results from imaging technologies demonstrate the distributed nature of language processing, which undermine theories of a single, distinct "language organ". The broader term "language faculty" can be taken to mean a network of distributed processes, and recent work has thrown light on the relationship between structure and function of various brain areas. For a few examples out of a very large number of publications see for instance (Friederici, 2011; Poeppel, Idsardi, & Wassenhove, 2007; Hickok & Poeppel, 2004; Hickok, 2010; Pulvermuller & Fadiga, 2010; Meyer et al., 2005) . Friederici concludes "the function of an area should always be considered within a neural network of which it is part" (ibid, page 1386).
The Mirror System Hypothesis leads on to the theory of the gestural origin of language, whereby a practical action may become ritualized to serve as a communicative signal. However, as Arbib points out, the gestural origin of language is strongly contested. The hypothesis of the gestural origin of language illustrates a characteristic of theories on the evolution of language: the tendency to assert that one route provides a sole explanation. There is no reason to suppose that one significant factor excludes other explanations, such as the hypotheses that social bonding and vocal developments also came to be associated with the emergence of language.
Related to the issue of multiple evolutionary routes it is instructive to see what a range of functions language covers, and a nice example comes from the isolated Mbendjele pygmies in the Congo. These hunter-gatherers have many speaking styles: information passing for planning a hunt; terse communication, possibly mimicking birds and animals, while on a hunt; the contrasting noisy chatter of women which can discourage wild animals; a declarative style of speech to an audience when hunting exploits are re-enacted, as well as an intimate style of private talk (Lewis, 2009 ) It would be surprising if such a range of functions had not evolved through multiple routes.
The third section of this handbook is on The prehistory of language: when and why did it evolve, which gives a wide ranging review, much of the material being about human evolution in general, not just language. The evidence adduced for the theories presented here are from various disciplines including molecular research, the analysis of DNA, the fossil record, and archaeological discoveries. In their introduction (chapter 23) the authors highlight different theories, in particular on the relationship of Neanderthal to modern man. A fascinating chapter by Cann (chapter 24) explains how one stream of genetic evidence, from mitrochondial DNA, supports the argument that Neanderthal and modern humans diverged into separate lineages, with a last common ancestor about 315-538 kya (thousand years ago). On this view modern humans emerged later from Africa, eventually replacing the Neanderthal further north, which died out about 30 kya. An opposing view, based on other genetic observations from nuclear DNA, posits a possibly more recent divergence, about 270-440 kya, together with some interbreeding after the split.
Hard (in the literal sense) fossil evidence is notoriously difficult to interpret. Wood and Bauernfiend write on The fossil record: evidence for speech in early hominins, identifying 22 taxa for pre-archaic hominins from 7 mya to homo sapiens. (Other authorities would not split the examples into so many separate taxa.) Since soft tissue does not fossilize research into the evolution of speech is largely focused on deducing possible developments from skeletal remains. However, like others in the field, the authors doubt the wisdom of using endocranial morphology as a proxy for identifying functional regions of the cortex. And though the cortex is by no means the only brain structure that contributes to language (Gibson, chapter 16) they conclude that little can be deduced about the speech capabilities of archaic hominins. One measurable feature is of course head size with consequent estimates of brain size. The modern human brain is larger than that of primates, both in absolute terms and relative to whole body size, increasing in size with evolutionary developments. However, as noted above, microcephalics can speak to a limited extent, while large mammals like whales and elephants have much larger brains in absolute size.
The dates at which evolutionary stages were reached is a matter of intense interest, especially those that could be associated with linguistic abilities. The types of proxy evidence that can be adduced include findings of tools, deliberate burials, ornaments and body paints and their transportation. A reasonable assumption is made that these cultural developments are likely to be found alongside the emergence of language. The oldest known stone tools date back to about 2.6 mya, as described by Wynn in a chapter on The paleolithic record (chapter 27). We are so used to the phrase "hunter-gatherer" that we may overlook the possibility that early hominins were fishers too. String for making nets would have been a vital tool, but of course it would not be preserved. Earliest signs of fire are dated by some archaeologists to 1.4 mya, others put convincing evidence much later at about 790 kya. A mortuary find in Spain shows that about 400 kya thirty human remains were left in a deep vertical shaft. Deliberate burials are first found about 115 kya in the Middle East (Mann, chapter 26).
The role of ornaments and body paints, such as ochre, as indicators of language ability usually rests on the argument that the use of such adornments necessitates cultural conventions. It is then argued that language is needed to create and maintain such conventions (Botha, chapter 30). Furthermore, the use of ornaments implies a theory of mind: the wearer must have an idea of what others think of him or her.
de Boer produces a chapter on Infant directed speech [IDS] and language evolution (chapter 33). He lists 3 types of IDS: to attract attention, to soothe and to make meaningful utterances; to these we might add the use of language for playful interaction between carer and infant. His comment that infants cannot learn to distinguish speech categories from adult directed speech on television is only to be expected. Whether the speech is adult or infant directed it is unlikely to be effective, since contingent interaction seems essential for learning (Kuhl, 2004 (Kuhl, , 2007 . de Boer's substantive argument is that IDS might have played a role in the evolution of language. He refers to Fitch's work on kin selection, and suggests that the need to reinforce the mother-infant bond could have been the basis of languagethe "mother tongue" hypothesis. de Boer points out that this theory does not explain how complex language would evolve, nor how it would spread beyond close kinfolk.
A chapter by Locke (chapter 34) speculates on the evolution of vocal and verbal complexity in a developmental frame, suggesting how fitness might be interpreted at different stages. He goes on to argue that vocal and verbal complexity are only display characteristics of males, exhibiting cognitive capabilities: "lexicons have more words than the average speaker needs to know, and grammars provide complex syntactic patterns that seem communicatively inessential". This seems out of touch with the real world: lexicons cater for various people in their different situations, and a word not widely used may be essential for certain trades. As for the use of grammar, one of the functions of language is to exchange information, which even in primitive times would often have been facilitated by a hierarchical grammar with embedded clauses. Consider how a man who was part of a cooperative hunt might want to say: "Hide by the trees where the big bird has made its nest while we drive the deer down the hill towards you". Compare this to "We drive the deer down the hill towards you so you hide by the trees. There the big bird has made its nest". The latter utterance lacks the contemporaneous reference indicated by while and has a possibly ambiguous anaphoric reference there. Though cooperative hunting does not require language, as evidenced by group hunting animals, a tribe that could plan a cooperative hunting or fishing exercise most effectively would have an advantage.
In contrast to speculative suggestions Gibson (chapter 35) gives an outline of the development of tool-dependent foraging strategies, with dates based on best estimates from empirical research. The use of tools, with non-ape foraging strategies, emerging 2.6 -3 mya. By 1.8 mya hominins had expanded into Eurasia and were manufacturing hand axes. At some point hominins began to use fire to cook and to produce containers to gather and transport food. By 400 kya hominins were using spears to hunt big game, and she tells us that by 164 kya there is evidence that modern humans may have been charting lunar cycles and predicting tides associated with fishing practices (Marean, 2007 (Marean, , 2012 . The development of foraging and hunting strategies requires information exchange which would be less effective without language.
Dunbar (chapter 36) gives an introduction to his well known theories on Gossip and the social origins of language. He argues that social bonding through grooming, as seen in primates today, becomes infeasible when group size increases, but this bonding mechanism can be replaced by vocal expression that many in the community can hear at once. Informal chatter and gossip are essential for group coherence. Returning to the example of the Pygmy's language use, informal chatter is frequently observed -but is not the only language type. Given the many functions of language there is no reason to assume that this explanation excludes others.
Part 4 of the handbook, titled Launching language: the development of a linguistic species, addresses semantic, phonological and syntactic issues. Hurford examines the limited capacity of animals to associate a signal with a concept (chapter 40). He distinguishes dyadic and triadic communication: dyadic involves just the sender and receiver such as ritualised signals for greetings, courtship, or challenges which are common among animals. Triadic communication involves the sender, the receiver and something about the state of the world, which is barely encountered among non-humans. This seems a key insight into the difference between human and animal communication. We note that primates in captivity, such as the bonobo Kanzi, can be taught the triadic communication skill of pointing, usually to request a desired object, but have never been observed to point in the wild. As to why humans alone acquired language, Hurford commends Tomasello's view that "shared intentionality" -the ability to discern another's goals and help to achieve themis crucial. Shared intentionality has been observed in primates, see for example (Call & Tomasello, 2009) . In cetaceans there are many anecdotal reports of dolphins supporting ailing conspecifics, and even helping humans. Tales go back at least to Greek and Indian antiquity. 1 The further step of understanding when, others have a false belief (typically acquired about the age of 3 to 4 in humans) has also been observed in primates (Wheeler, 2009; Attenborough, 2009) .
The theory that language evolved initially from manual gestures is argued by Corballis (chapter 41), saying that mirror neurons support "the evolutionary priority of gesture". The problem word here is "priority": the arguments that gesture had a role to play are convincing, but it does not follow that it necessarily had a pre-eminent position. We note in passing that blind children can of course learn to talk, but usually slightly later than their sighted contemporaries. Continuing the theme of required cognitive capacities, Deacon (chapter 43) expounds his well known theories on The symbol concept and draws our attention to symbolic representation as a key component of language, missing from animal calls.
Studdert-Kennedy (chapter 45) writes on The emergence of phonetic form, describing the important role of babbling in normal development of a child, and implying that there could have been parallels with the development of speech in evolutionary time. He describes a model by Lindblom (Lindblom, Diehl, Park, & Salvi, 2011 ) that predicts syllable trajectories through a process of trading off articulatory cost against perceptual discrimination. He also briefly mentions the interesting work of Oudeyer (Oudeyer, 2006) showing through models of speakers and listeners that speech sounds become grouped into perceptual categories, phonemes, through self-organization, without selective pressure.
MacNeilage (chapter 46) gives a short, informative review of Innateness and phonological theory endorsing the conclusions that phonological features are not innate. This is demonstrated by Mielke (Mielke, 2008) after studying almost 600 of the world's languages, and previously argued by the eminent phonetician Ladefoged. MacNeilage points out that acoustic correlates of major speech features constitute continua, with no underlying discrete categories (as those working in speech recognition know to their cost). He sees the key event in the evolution of phonology as the ability to concatenate a few transmission units into a large number of packages -an exaptation from primitive motor functions used elsewhere in language understanding (as noted by the author of this review (Lyon, Sato, Saunders, & Nehaniv, 2009) ).
The evolution of syntax is one of the key challenges for researchers. A large part of the Introduction to the whole book (chapter 1) is devoted to this subject. Later (chapter 48) Tallerman gives an overview of some features of English syntax, leading on to a discussion initiated by an influential article by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (M. Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002) 2 . They distinguished between the Faculty of Language in the Broad Sense (FLB), which holds capabilities developed for other cognitive processes too, and is possibly shared with other animals, and the Faculty of Language in the Narrow Sense (FLN). They hypothesize that "FLN only includes recursion and is the only uniquely human component of the faculty of language". The meaning of "recursion" is open to different interpretations, variously taken as self-embedded clauses (e.g. "She said that he was late") or a hierarchical structure in general, (e.g. a system in which sounds make up syllables, syllables combine to make up words, which constitute phrases and phrases combine to make up sentences.) Bickerton (chapter 49), in contrast to his earlier views, points out that belief in a "language organ" has faded as imaging techniques show the extent to which linguistic operations are distributed across the brain. He outlines a possible sequence of steps in syntactic evolution, positing that single linguistic items needed to be linked, and the primate brain would have been ready to process them, in ways analogous to other neural activities, such as visual or auditory processing.
Information on how grammar emerges can be drawn from the development of Creole languages, and Carstairs-McCarthy (chapter 50) draws on Bickerton's earlier research to show that grammatical structures appear among first generation users. He also looks at two languages that might provide antecedents of fully modern language: Riau Indonesian (RI) and Piraha from a remote area of Brazil, but analysis of their grammars is inconclusive. The simplicity of RI is debated, while the reported lack of recursion in Piraha is disputed. In chapter 51 titled Protolanguage Tallerman draws together points from earlier chapters, arguing that primate calls are not likely to be precursors of human language, but that primate cognition is more relevant.
Part 5 of the handbook is titled Language change, creation, and transmission in modern humans. As well as changes in historical times, this goes back further to extrapolate from observed changes to see how early languages might have developed. Plausible scenarios are reconstructed. Heine and Kuteva (chapter 54) propose a layered model of grammatical development, supposing there were only nouns or noun-like items at the start, followed by other word classes -verbs, adjectives, adverbs -which together with nouns can make compositional forms. However, it is not clear why nouns should be given a pre-eminent position: it is true that infants perceive and produce nouns at the earliest stages of language acquisition, but this does not entail such a privileged position for nouns in evolutionary times. Early words could just as easily have been adjectival, describing conditions such as "hungry", "painful" or "warm" or imperative verbs: "come", "go". However, the lack of evidence regarding the privileged status of nouns does not negate the underlying concept behind the layering model, that single items can be compounded to produce a new element in ever increasing layers of complexity. Bybee (chapter 55) endorses this approach: once two words can be strung together grammaticalization can begin, and grammatical constructions developed.
An interesting chapter by Pakendorf (chapter 59) explains how molecular anthropology can be used in research into language transmission through contacts between populations. It can be shown that "linguistic shift can result in a mismatch between the genetic and linguistic affiliation of a group (that is, a group is genetically more similar to its geographic neighbours than to its linguistic relatives)" (page 577). This can contribute to insights into prehistoric population and language movements.
There are four chapters on computational models addressing different aspects of linguistic development. They start with a helpful overview (Smith, chapter 60), on Why formal models are useful for evolutionary linguists as tools that allow the consequences of a given set of assumptions to be explored. He describes the example of Kirby's model (Kirby & Hurford, 2002) in which a compositional language can evolve from an unstructured protolanguage, which he sees as analogous to a cultural process. The following chapter 61 by Kirby himself, gives a context to socio / cultural transmission, and suggests that his iterated learning approach can deliver a solution, in which the emergence of language looks almost inevitable. Angelosi (chapter 62) moves on to consider examples of Robotics and embodied agent modelling of the evolution of language, describing experiments on communication between prelinguistic agents with signalling capabilities. He also describes the emergence of shared lexicons, for instance in Steels' well known "Talking Heads" experiments (Steels, 1999) and his work in modelling some aspects of the evolution of syntax. Robots playing language games show that syntactic constraints facilitate language comprehension (Steels, 2001) . In chapter 63 de Boer explains how dynamic self-organizing models can result in the emergence of small vowel systems, through a process of maximizing acoustic distinctiveness in the hearer together with acoustic ease in the speaker. (Information theoretic approaches can also address these issues (Lyon, Dickerson, & Nehaniv, 2003 ) )
The discussion of computational models leads on to a brief chapter by Graf Estes (chapter 64) reporting that statistical language learning has been observed in a number of investigations with human infants (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; GrafEstes, Evans, Alibali, & Saffran, 2007, for example) . Though these relate to language acquisition by modern individuals they identify a mechanism that could have had significant influence on language evolution. Not only has learning of distinct linguistic items, such as syllables or words, been observed but also non-adjacent dependencies between items, constructions of the form aXb where a and b are constant while X is variable, a type of proto-syntax (Friederici, Mueller, & Oberecker, 2011) . This chapter on statistical language learning is another example of empirical research rather than theoretical speculations that make this book well worth consulting.
Overall, a number of chapters in this handbook make valuable contributions to the varied approaches taken in evolution of language studies. Boeckx (chapter 52) gives an outline of the Minimalist Programme, inspired by Chomsky. This Biolinguistic approach is motivated by work in theoretical linguistics and comparative psychology, and draws on research on principles of systems biology. It points to plausible conjectures, such as the idea that the mental computation needed in knot tying is comparable to that required in language. The role of natural selection is de-emphasized. Boeckx proposes that an innate Universal Grammar component "emerged spontaneously, by the sheer force of biophysics" (page 496), and concludes by presenting his views like an article of faith: "I firmly believe [in the] Minimalist Programme" (page 501).
A curious inclusion is Chapter 31 by Lightfoot entitled "Natural selection-itis" which states that natural selection has been over-used. He asserts that other "deep, physical principles" explain the evolution of Universal Grammar, and taking an analogy with astronomy says: "On a par with dark matter is brain matter". I would also ask Knight and Power (chapter 37) to justify their view that "hunter-gatherers living in societies most similar to those in which we evolved are committed egalitarians".
On omissions, the limited neuroscientific coverage has been discussed. It seems churlish to suggest anything else should be added to a book of this length, but I thought Chomsky and also Pinker were given rather short shrift in view of their influence. Chomsky's most recent publications (Chomsky, 2005 (Chomsky, , 2010 deserve attention. However, this is not to detract from the positive aspects of this handbook, and in conclusion I recommend you to dip into this book and benefit from the many excellent chapters -but read it with discretion.
